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THE SHAREHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE SUIT-A SOLUTION TO THE
POLLUTION PROBLEM?
INTRODUCTION
Urbanization, industrial development and the growth of transpor-
tation have given rise to one of society's most serious and urgent
problems-pollution.' While the gravity of the pollution problem has
been recognized for many years,2 legislative and private attempts to
attack this problem have been largely ineffective.8 This ineffectiveness
has been caused primarily by the rapid increase in the sources of pollution
and society's continued failure to accept responsibility for coping with the
problem.
If a corporation is polluting the air and water, its shareholders may
play an important role in restraining this contamination. Assume X
has been a hypothetical shareholder of the Midville Public Service Com-
pany for 15 years. During this time the company has expanded its
1. I now turn to a subject which, next to our desire for peace, may well
become the major concern of the American people in the decade of the '70's.
The great question of the '70's is: Shall we surrender to our surroundings,
or shall we make our peace with nature and begin to make reparations for
the damage we have done to our air, to our land, and to our water?
Clean air, clean water, open spaces-these should once again be the
birthright of every American. If we act now, they can be.
Message to the Congress on the State of the Union by President Richard M. Nixon,
Jan. 22, 1970.
2. Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act in 1899. The Act made it
unlawful "to throw, discharge or deposit . . . any refuse matter . . . other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into any
navigable water of the United States . . . ." Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 13, 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
As early as 1845 the state of Illinois recognized that harm might result from
pollution and made it a public offense to pollute the waters and highways of Illinois.
Act of Mar. 3, 1845, § 145 [1845] II1. Laws 173.
3. The legislative and private attempts to attack the pollution problem have been
discussed in the following: Bylinsky, The Limited War on Water Pollution, FORTUNE,
Feb., 1970, at 103; Delogu, Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control and Proposed State
Legislation for Such Control, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 886; Esposito, Air and Water Pol-
lution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV.
LID. L. REV. 32 (1970); Hagevick, Legislating for Air Quality Management: Reducing
Theory to Practice, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 369 (1968); Jurgensmeyer, Control
of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126;
O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD.
275 (1968); Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution Control-State and Local
Legislative Purpose and Techniques, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 331 (1968); Reitze,
Pollution Control-Why Has It Failed?, 55 A.B.A.J. 923 (1969); Rheingold, Civil
Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33
BROOKLYN L. REV. 17 (1966); Schmitz, Pollution, Law, Science and Damage Awards,
18 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 456 (1969); Note, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 24
WAS H. & LEE L. REV. 314 (1967).
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facilities and has had increased earnings. As a result of the company's
growth, X's dividends have yielded an above average rate of return on
his investment. X has discovered, however, that the company in which he
has had so much faith and pride is one of the major contributors to both
air and water pollution in his community. He has learned that the
Midville Company does not have adequate pollution control plans for
its present or future facilities. The purpose of this note is to suggest that
a shareholder such as X may bring a derivative suit against the directors
of a given corporation to force them to take the necessary steps to insure
adequate pollution control.
INDUSTRY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLLUTION CONTROL
The shareholder must first determine whether the corporation has
any duty to control the pollution from its facilities before he can proceed
with a derivative suit against its directors. In states which prohibit
pollution by statute, the extent of the corporation's legal duty is measured
by legislative regulations.' In states which do not specifically prohibit
pollution by statute, it is arguable that there still exists a social duty to
the community not to pollute.' Since the judiciary may be hesitant to
recognize this social duty without some attendant legal responsibility,'
it becomes incumbent upon the shareholder to convince the court that this
social duty is deserving of recognition and enforcement. The effects of
pollution are equally detrimental with or without regulations, and there-
fore the existence of legislative sanction should not be conclusive of the
question of relief. If the legislature will not act or does not act in a
responsive manner, the courts may have to take the initiative to adapt
existing theories of law, such as the common law public nuisance doctrine,
to contend with this serious problem.7 Restraining action must be swift
4. See Appendix.
5. See generally Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50
B.U.L. REv. 157 (1970) ; Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders,
Managers, Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248 (1969).
6. See generally Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50
B.U.L. REv. 157 (1970) ; Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders,
Managers, Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248 (1969).
7. It is sobering to remember that for almost two hundred years the courts
have generally balanced the equities in favor of industrial exploitation of
the environment. In a statement distinguished for its candor if not for its
wisdom, one judge has said: '. . . one's bread is more important than the
landscape or clear skies. Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained
a pretty village.'
It is time for the courts to abandon this brand of Judicial Merchantilism and
to set out to redress the imbalance of the last two hundred years.
Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington, 5
HARv. Crv. RIGHTs-Cv. Li. L. REv. 32, 52 (1970).
"If lawyers and their clients are willing to ask for less than the impossible, the
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and effective in order to control the corporate polluter.
Courts have continually adhered to the principle that a corporation's
primary responsibility is to be profit-motivated.8 Contemporary social
attitudes, however, indicate that business must also be responsive to the
problems and needs of the community.' At present, fewer than two
hundred of the nation's corporations make up the "central switchboard
of the nation's economy;"'" by virtue of their influential status, they have
placed themselves in a position of social responsibility. To elucidate the
impact of business upon society, one writer has stated:
As a significant social and economic force in our economy,
business possesses the ability and the power to accomplish or
hinder social goals as well as determine the structure of our
economy ....
The power and pervasiveness of business no longer raises
the question of whether business will affect our society but only
how it will do so."
The present-day advocate of the private enterprise and laissez-faire
philosophies should agree that business must accept a social responsibility
at least commensurate with its economic influence if it is to operate with
a minimum of interference and regulation.' 2 Business, as well as the
individual, has the responsibility of being a good citizen.'
judiciary can be expected to play an increasingly important and fruitful role in safe-
guarding the public trust." Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 473, 566 (1970).
8. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
9. See A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 26 N.J. Super. 106, 97 A.2d 186, aff'd,
13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953) (corporate contribu-
tion to private educational institution held not an ultra vires act) ; People ex rel.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150, 120 N.Y.S. 649 (1909)
(operation of hospital for company's employees held lawful) ; A. BERLE, THE 20TH
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); H. GRAM, ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPON-
SIBILITY (1969); Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L.
REV. 157 (1970); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trusteest, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 1145 (1932); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory-Shareholders, Managers and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248 (1969).
10. A. BERLE & W. WARREN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION-CORPORATIONS 1107 (1948).
11. H. GRAM, ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN BUSINESS 64-65 (1969).
12. Business is in significant measure responsible for the social conditions in
question and therefore has a special responsibility to solve the problems it has
created. It is suggested that in its own self-interest, business must act in order
to prevent adverse public and governmental reaction. Under this view, so-called
social responsibility is no more than self-correction of' the underlying business
operation that produced the adverse social effect in the first place.
Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. REV. 157, 166
(1970).
13. Address of Owen D. Young, former chairman of the board of General Electric,
Jan., 1929, quoted in J. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 209 (1929).
1970]
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The events surrounding Ralph Nader's recent shareholders'
campaign against General Motors is illustrative of how the public can
force business to recognize greater leadership and responsibility."4 Al-
though "Campaign GM" failed in its goal of placing three representatives
of the public on General Motors' board of directors, it was successful
in forcing the giant corporation to consider the effect of its operations
on the general public and the environment. James M. Roche, chairman
and chief executive of General Motors, stated after the assault by the
Nader group: "I don't think we won a victory. We won a vote of
confidence. We could lose that vote of confidence very quickly unless we
respond in the way our shareholders expect us to."" Other individuals
have also initiated programs in which they hope to use stockholder
proxies to make large corporations more responsive to present social
problems.'"
Recent reports indicate that industries and public utilities are sub-
stantial contributors to atmospheric and aquatic pollution.' Industry
contaminates the air and water either directly by emitting solid or gaseous
wastes or indirectly by manufacturing various products, such as auto-
mobiles, which themselves contribute to the problem. Therefore, many
contend that industry should assume a proportionate share of the re-
sponsibility for pollution control.'
Once the shareholder has determined that there is a legal and/or
social duty on the part of his corporation to control its pollution, his
next step is to examine whatever legal principles are necessary to enforce
this duty.
GROUNDS FOR A SHAREHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE SUIT
Shareholders traditionally do not have a direct power of control
over a company's internal operations ;19 however, they do have the right
14. See generally N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1970, at 1, col. 4; Wall St. J., May 25, 1970,
at 4, col. 4.
15. Wall St. J., May 25, 1970, at 4, col. 4.
16. Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1970, at 38, col. 1; Corporations-Proxies for Protesters,
TIME, Jan. 26, 1970, at 69.
17. SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, COMMITTEE ON CHEMISTRY
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY, CLEANING OUR ENVIRONMENT-
THE CHEMICAL BASIS FOR ACTION 58-59, 64, 139 (1969).
18. Community sentiment toward this problem was reflected in a survey reported
by Newsweek in 1966. The survey reported that 90 percent of Americans thought that
business should assume the leadership and responsibility of attacking the pollution
dilemma. What Americans Really Think of Business, NEWSWEEK, May 2, 1966, at 85.
19. "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of
directors except as may be otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation." ABA-
ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1969).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1970], Art. 9
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to institute suit on behalf of the corporation if the directors are derelict
in their duties. The two grounds upon which the courts have allowed
shareholder interference are: 1) negligent management of the corpora-
tion and 2) actual or threatened violation of law or public policy.20
While it is recognized that a shareholder must cope with numerous
technical and possibly defeating procedural requirements,2 ' the remainder
of this note will be limited to a discussion of the substantive grounds
on which a derivative suit may be brought, the procedural defenses
available to defendant directors and the remedies available to share-
holders.
Negligent Management by Directors or Officers
Despite their reluctance to interfere with the internal operations of
a corporation,22 courts have granted relief where the shareholder can
establish that the directors have negligently or wilfully breached their
fiduciary duty2" to the corporation and that this breach has or will
20. "For the courts to intervene there must be actual or threatened acts which are
ultra vires, fraudulent, and injurious, and are an abusive power, and are acts of oppres-
sion on the part of the Corporation or of its officers." Golden v. St. Joseph Milk
Producers' Ass'n, 420 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). See also 3 FLETCHER CYC.
CORP. § 990 (perm. ed. 1965).
21. The following factors may play an important role in the shareholder's
derivative suit: 1) in most jurisdictions the shareholder must satisfy the requirement
of "contemporaneous ownership," that is, the plaintiff-shareholder must have been a
shareholder at the time of the wrong about which he complains; 2) a prerequisite to a
shareholder's derivative suit is a demand by the shareholder on the board of directors
and the other shareholders for redress of the wrong against the corporation except
where such a demand would be futile; 3) some jurisdictions require that shareholders
with less than prescribed holdings give security for the corporation's litigation expenses;
4) the directors and officers of the corporation may be indemnified for the litigation
expenses which they may incur in defending against the suit; and 5) the plaintiff may
be reimbursed by the corporation for his attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses.
For a further discussion of these factors, see H. HENN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 352-83 (1961); Bishop, Indemnification of
Corporate Directors, Officers and Employees, 20 Bus. LAW. 833 (1965) ; Hornstein,
The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. Rxv. 784 (1939);
Note, Demand on Directors and Stockholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit,
73 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1960); Note, Security for Expenses' Requirement in Stock-
holders' Derivative Actions, 42 ILL. L. REv. 667 (1947).
22. Within the limits of their authority officers and directors possess full
discretionary power and in the honest and reasonable exercise of such power
they are not subject to control by the stockholders or by the courts, at the
instance of a stockholder. In the absence of usurpation, fraud, or gross
negligence, courts of equity will not interfere at the suit of dissatisfied
stockholders, merely to overrule and control the discretions of directors on
questions of corporate management, policy, or business ....
Peters v. Woodmen Acc. & Life Co., 170 Neb. 861, 873, 104 N.W.2d 490, 496 (1960).
23. [A director or officer] owes loyalty and allegiance to the corporation-
a loyalty that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action by
no consideration other than the welfare of the corporation. Any adverse interest
of a director will be subjected to a scrutiny rigid and uncompromising.
et al.: The Shareholder's Derivative Suit—A Solution to the Pollution Pro
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cause damage to the corporation."
The standard of care that is required of directors and officers in
their fiduciary relationship to the corporation has been subject to various
interpretations."5  Many jurisdictions have provided by statute that
directors and officers are required to exercise "that degree of diligence,
care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions."2 In jurisdictions which lack
this statutory standard, an analogous duty is enforced by application of
the "business judgment rule." This rule provides that directors should
not be liable for "mere errors of judgment" in their daily management
of the corporation as long as they act in good faith.27
In a case involving pollution control, a shareholder would be
justified in interfering with the internal affairs of his corporation if the
directors have not exercised the proper diligence, care and skill in
evaluating and implementing the corporation's pollution control plan.
The following are a few factors which an ordinarily prudent director
should take into consideration:
1) the adequacy of the company's pollution control efforts
for existing and proposed facilities;
2) the acceptance by the community of the corporation's pollu-
tion control efforts ;8
3) the demands imposed by the various state and federal pollu-
He may not profit at the expense of his corporation and in conflict with its
rights; he may not for personal gain divert unto fimself the opportunities
which in equity and fairness belong to his corporation. He is required to use
his independent judgment. In the discharge of his duties a director must, of
course, act honestly and in good faith ....
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
24. It is important that in a negligence action there exist either actual damage
or the imminent threat of damage to the corporation. Without the important damage
element, there will not be any basis for relief--either compensatory or injunctive. See
H. HENN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 235,
at 367 (1961) ; Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the
Air?, 68 MIcn. L. Rxv. 1254 (1970).
25. See Dyson, The Directors' Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341 (1965).
26. Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20
Bus. LAw. 817, 819 (1965).
27. The "business judgment rule" has been stated as follows:
The director who diligently attends to his duties and exercises his best
business judgment on the questions facing him -will not be considered
negligent even if his judgment is faulty.
Dyson, The Directors' Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 369 (1965).
28& Even though a corporation may take the necessary steps to comply with
statutory pollution standards by the date prescribed, such efforts may be inadequate. If
the community demands that the corporation comply with the standards at an earlier
date, the directors must consider that failure to satisfy the community demands may
adversely affect the the corporation's goodwill.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1970], Art. 9
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tion control standards and deadlines;
4) the pressures exerted by successful litigation against similar
companies ;"
5) the present and projected future installation cost of pollution
control devices;"
6) the ability of the corporation to transfer the cost of pollution
control to the consumers ;81
7) the existence of economic incentives for pollution control ;f'
8) the availability of corporate retained earnings for pollution
control investment; and
9) the present and projected future interest rates in the finan-
cial market."
In most cases, it would be difficult to prove that directors had im-
properly considered any one of these factors. In some instances, however,
the negligence of the directors could be shown by their apparent disregard
of these factors and their failure to take corrective measures.
The breach of corporate duty by directors is not sufficient of itself to
to justify judicial interference.' A shareholder who initiates a derivative
suit must establish that a dissipation or waste of the corporation's
tangible or intangible assets has resulted from the wilful or negligent
failure of the directors to take appropriate steps to control pollution.
Damage to tangible assets may result if the directors have con-
tinually delayed the installation of pollution control devices in present
29. If private citizen's groups have successfully enjoined a corporation from
disposing of waste material in a lake, it would seem that corporations guilty of similar
practices should voluntarily cease polluting before they too are sued and suffer from
the adverse publicity thereby created.
30. A director should certainly consider that the costs of labor, material and
pollution control equipment may increase in subsequent years so that a delaying of
installation could cost the corporation additional sums of money.
31. Companies in many industries may be able to spend the necessary money for
pollution control and then increase the price of their customer products. Some com-
panies would not be able to pass along the cost to their customers because it would
affect their competitive standing with other companies in the industry and even with
foreign companies. Although public utility companies do not have to concern themselves
with competition, they must have rate increases approved by an appropriate govern-
mental agency.
32. As adopted by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, section 169 allows
for pollution control facilities to be amortized over a sixty-month period. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 169.
Other economic incentives which have been suggested include: effluent fees, effluent
payments and equipment tax credits. Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can
Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 Mica. L. Rzv. 1254, 1258 n.27 (1970).
33. If "tighter" money and higher interest rates are predicted by economists for
future years, a prudent director may demand that his corporation borrow the necessary
funds now.
34. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
1970]
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facilities or the design of such devices for future facilities. The costs of
pollution control under a "crash program" to meet statutory deadlines
will undoubtedly be greater than the costs under a program which is
planned and launched well in advance of a deadline date. Inaction by
directors may also subject the corporation to large fines for violation of
pollution laws. If directors do not take advantage of economic incentives
devised by the government to induce earlier or more effective pollution
control, they could be held liable for the resulting loss of corporate
profit.85 While the above discussion is not comprehensive, it is illustrative
of the kind of damage a corporation might sustain.
In addition to the waste of tangible assets, the courts, under proper
circumstances, have held the directors and officers liable for damage to
goodwill when the damage resulted from their mismanagement." For
example, in Sessinghaus Milling Co. v. Hanebrink" it was alleged that
the general manager had manufactured and sold inferior flour which he
knowingly allowed to be represented as a finer grade of flour which the
company also produced. The court held that the corporation could
recover damages from the general manager for injuries to its reputation
and goodwill since these were valuable and real assets of the corpora-
tion.'
A shareholder may show that the directors' failure to take the
appropriate steps to control pollution has resulted in damage to corporate
goodwill. Damage to goodwill may be evidenced by many facts such as
public opposition in rezoning and eminent domain hearings, loss of
employee loyalty to the corporation or loss of corporate sales and profit.
The Commonwealth Edison Company, for example, was ranked first
among Chicago's air polluters by the Chicago Department of Environ-
mental Control." Citizens and customers have become so agitated with
Commonwealth Edison that various groups have been organized to exert
pressure upon it. One Chicago group encouraged members of the public
to pay their electric bills into a trust fund until the company curtailed
35. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
36. Good will is defined as:
The advantage or benefit which is required by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of the capital, stocks, funds, or property employed therein, in
consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it
receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position
or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence or punctuality, or
from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient
partialities or prejudices.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 823 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
37. 247 Mo. 212, 152 S.W. 354 (1912).
38. Id. at 222, 152 S.W. at 357.
39. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1970, at 61, col. 1.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1970], Art. 9
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its sulfur oxide emissions.40 Another group, the Committee Against
Pollution, waged a proxy battle at Commonwealth Edison's annual
stockholders' meeting in an effort to pass various antipollution resolu-
tions.4 ' The company also encountered public opposition to a request for
a 6.1 percent rate increase. Subsequently, the Illinois Commerce Com-
mission granted only a 4.5 percent increase and demanded that the
company spend $200 million during the next few years to control
pollution or face the loss of half of the increase.42 It is apparent that
public dissatisfaction with Commonwealth Edison's pollution control
efforts has caused the company's management to counteract the assaults
on its goodwill. In an attempt to maintain a favorable image, Common-
wealth Edison sent to its stockholders an eight-page brochure and
published advertisements in a Chicago newspaper48 to explain its plans
for pollution control. As a practical matter, any corporation-whether
it is a public utility, a steel producer or an automobile manufacturer-
should be carefully managed in order to protect its goodwill.
In summary, a shareholder who brings a derivative suit on the
grounds of negligent management will encounter several obstacles. First,
a shareholder must present a case which will warrant interference by the
courts. There should be a clear indication of actual or threatened damage
to the corporation. Secondly, proof of injury to the corporation will be
difficult because the damages in some instances, though real in nature,
may be economically speculative. Thirdly, it will be difficult to prove that
a director or officer has breached the required standard of care. However,
as the courts recognize the seriousness of pollution and develop standards
for directors in the area of pollution control, such considerations should
become less problematic.
Violation of Law or Public Policy
A shareholder may also contend that when corporate pollution
occurs the directors and officers are conducting the corporation in a
manner which is contrary to public policy and in violation of the law.
The violation of law or public policy as the basis for a derivative suit is
not a new concept. One area of law in which the derivative suit has been
successfully employed is the field of antitrust law.44 In one antitrust
40. Chicago Today, Jan. 31, 1970, at 61, col. 3.
41. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1970, at 61, col. 1.
42. Wall St. J., July 13, 1970, at 2, col. 2.
43. Chicago Today, Dec. 8, 1969, at 13; Id., Feb. 9, 1970, at 13; Id., Mar. 9, 1970,
at 39.
44. Brill v. General Indus. Enterprises, 234 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1956); Granchon
& Marcho, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953) ; American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Gomberg
1970]
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case, 5 the officers of a Montana copper mining corporation had sold
their shares and agreed to operate the company subject to the demands of
another corporation which was attempting to create an unlawful
monopoly." The plaintiff, a shareholder of the Montana corporation,
brought a derivative suit against the officers to compel them to abandon
the unlawful combination and to operate the corporation by lawful
means. In holding for the plaintiff, the court stated:
The officers of a corporation are trustees; by their acts in
engaging in an unlawful enterprise, and making the corporation
a party to it, they are guilty of a breach of trust, and both they
and the corporation can be held to account by a court of
equity . . ..
The court further maintained that if the shareholders were not allowed
to seek appropriate redress in a court of equity, the continued violation
of law by the corporation and its management might cause the property
rights of the corporation and its shareholders to be forfeited or
imperiled. 8 Similarly, if the directors or officers allow a corporation to
operate in violation of pollution laws, the corporation may be subjected
to servere penalties and possibly to a court order closing the facilities
which are operating in violation of law. 9
Shareholders have also been allowed to bring derivative suits where
directors or officers have ordered actions which violate state law."
In Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Manufacturing Co.," the plaintiff-
shareholder brought a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant corporation
from making further payments to a widow of a former officer. The court
determined that these payments did not qualify as a pension, compensation
for past service or a charitable contribution and were therefore unlawful
under the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law." The court stated
that
v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955); MacGuiness v. Boston & Mont.
Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co., 29 Mont. 428, 75 P. 89 (1904); Anderson v.
Shawnee Compress Co., 17 Okla. 231, 87 P. 315 (1906).
45. MacGuiness v. Boston & Mont. Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co., 29
Mont. 428, 75 P. 89 (1904).
46. Id. at 429, 75 P. at 90-91.
47. Id. at 430, 75 P. at 92.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Herring Motor Co. v. Walka Co., 409 Pa. 126, 185 A.2d 565
(1962).
50. See, e.g., Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295
(1952).
51. Id.
52. The court made this determination pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1301
(1967).
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[w]here the action of a board of directors ... is an abuse of
discretion, or is forbidden by statute or is against public policy
.. or will result in waste, dissipation or misapplication of the
corporate assets, a court of equity has the power to grant
appropriate relief. 8
The directors were accordingly enjoined from making any further
payments to the widow."'
Abrams v. Allen "5 further illustrates the willingness of the courts
to allow shareholders to bring a derivative suit to enjoin conduct which is
unlawful or against public policy. In Abrams various shareholders of
Remington Rand, Inc. alleged that "the directors had caused the dis-
mantling and removal of corporate plants and the intentional curtailment
of production solely to discourage, intimidate and punish the corpora-
tion's employees." 58 The plaintiffs further alleged that these actions were
taken solely because of the personal prejudices of the president, James
Rand, Jr., regarding labor policies."' The New York Court of Appeals
reversed an earlier dismissal of the derivative suit and held that the
shareholders should be allowed redress in the courts since the public
policy of the state and nation was clearly opposed to the closing or
removal of factories for the purposes alleged by the shareholders."
It would appear that the above cases provide some precedent to
sustain a shareholder's derivative suit to enjoin a corporation from the
actual or threatened violation of state and federal pollution laws. "
Where it is found that a corporation is operating in violation of these
laws, the shareholder's derivative suit could provide the necessary
pressure to force a corporation to comply with pollution laws. While all
states have not prescribed specific pollution standards, the legislatures of
numerous states have made it clear that pollution is against public
policy."0 Therefore, a shareholder may attack a corporate polluter solely
53. Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 370 Pa. 172, 176, 87 A2d 295, 298
(1952).
54. The court also ordered that if the widow did not repay all of the money which
was unlawfully paid to her, the directors would be personally responsible for reim-
bursing the corporation for any deficiency. Id. at 179, 87 A.2d at 299.
55. 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
56. Id. at 53, 74 N.E.2d at 306.
57. Id.
58. Upon remand the complaint in the Abrams case was dismissed on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendant directors had caused the
plants to be dismantled and removed solely as a means to defeat a strike. Abrams v.
Allen, 113 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
59. For a compilation of the various state pollution statutes, see the Appendix.
60. The discharge into the ambient air of air contaminants so as to cause
or contribute to air pollution is contrary to the public policy of Missouri
1970]
et al.: The Shareholder's Derivative Suit—A Solution to the Pollution Pro
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1970
160 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
on the grounds that it is operating contrary to a state's public policy.
PROCEDURAL DEFENSES
Although the scope of this note does not include a discussion of
all the procedural and substantive defenses to a derivative suit,"' there
are two common defenses which, if sustained, would be grounds for
dismissal of the shareholder's complaint. The following discussion will
examine these defenses.
Propriety of the Suit by the Shareholder
Corporate directors may argue that enforcement of pollution laws is
the duty of pollution control agencies and not the duty of shareholders.
This argument was rejected by the Second Circuit in a suit involving an
alleged violation of antitrust law.62 A shareholder had brought a deriva-
tive suit to enjoin the directors of the corporation from engaging in an
interlocking directorate with competing corporations. The defendant
directors maintained that enforcement of antitrust policies under the
Clayton Act was the task of the Federal Trade Commission and not
that of the shareholders. The court, however, allowed the shareholders to
maintain a derivative suit to enjoin violation of the Clayton Act." Since
the Act did not limit enforcement to the Federal Trade Commission, the
court ruled that the availability of private actions would augment the
enforcement of the antitrust policy. 4 This same reasoning was espoused
by the Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak." The Borak case held
that shareholders had the right to enforce the provisions of section 14(a)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.66 The Court declared that
one of the general purposes of the section was the protection of investors
and concluded that this implied the availiability of judicial relief through
and in violation of this chapter. It is the intent and purpose of this chapter
to maintain purity of the air resources of the state to protect the health, general
welfare and physical property of the people, maximum employment and full
industrial development of the state. The commission shall seek the accomplish-
ment of this objective through the prevention, abatement and control of air
pollution by all practical and economically feasible methods.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 203.030 (1959). Many states also have public nuisance statutes.
For a compilation of various public nuisance statutes, see Appendix.
61. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
62. Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
63. A collateral point decided in the case was that the plaintiff could be reim-
bursed by the corporation for his attorneys' fees only if there was some ultimate
benefit to the corporation. Id. at 540.
64. Id. at 539.
65. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
66. Clayton Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964), formerly ch. 404, § 14(a),
48 Stat. 895 (1934). This section of the Act deals with the solicitation of proxies.
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a private right of action.8" Since shareholders are damaged as a group by
violation of the section, "[t]o hold that derivative actions are not within
the sweep of the section would therefore be tantamount to a denial of
private relief. Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action."6 It is submitted, therefore, that even
though various governmental agencies have been granted the power to
enforce the standards of various pollution laws, shareholders should not
be denied the right to police their corporations for violations of law.
Benefit of the Suit to the Corporation
The purpose of a shareholder's derivative suit is to enforce a
corporate right for the benefit of the corporation."9 Directors may argue
that a shareholder's suit initiated to force compliance with pollution laws
creates no economic benefit for the corporation and that paying private
claims and statutory fines is less expensive than installing and operating
costly pollution control facilities."0 Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp."'
discussed the merits of this argument in a shareholder's suit seeking to
enjoin the consummation of a transaction alleged to be ultra vires under
the corporation's reorganization plan."2 The defendant directors argued
that the suit should be dismissed because the corporation might have
benefited from the agreement if it had been fully executed. In rejecting
this argument, the court stated:
[T]here is no relevance in an argument that this suit created
no fund or property for Textile or its security holders, or that
they or any of them would have been better off if the ultra
vires act had been performed. The law cannot refuse to re-
cognize as beneficial full observance of the law. The law cannot
67. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
68. Id.
69. A derivative action is one in which the grievance to be redressed has
been suffered primarily by the corporation and normally it should institute
the action. But where it fails or refuses to act after demand, the shareholder's
ultimate interest in the corporation is sufficient to warrant the prosecution
of a "propulsive" action ultimately to effect recovery for the corporation of
the rights or property of which it has been deprived by the wrongdoer.
Reed v. Norman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 892, 896, 314 P.2d 204, 207 (1957).
70. The plant manager of an aluminum plant responded to a question regarding
flouride controls as follows: "It is cheaper to pay claims than it is to control flourides."
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963).
In an interview with Dr. A. D. Brandt, manager of Environmental Quality
Control, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, in Burns Harbor, Indiana, on November 20,
1969, Dr. Brandt stated that corporate polluters are reluctant to spend large sums of
money for pollution control because it is generally a non-profit producing activity.
71. 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
72. Id. at 496.
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hold that corporate interests are better served by action outside
rather than within the law."'
An application of the court's reasoning to the area of pollution control
would appear to sanction the shareholder's derivative action and preclude
the directors from defending on the grounds that non-compliance is
economically beneficial.
THE PROBLEM OF RELIEF
Assuming that a shareholder can establish grounds entitling him to
relief, the burden will ultimately be placed upon the courts to determine
appropriate relief. Several of the problems and factors involved in grant-
ing the various forms of relief should be discussed.
A shareholder may request that the court order the directors to
take immediate steps to abate the pollution created by their facilities.
The difficulty with this form of relief, however, is that the court pro-
bably lacks the technical knowledge necessary to formulate an appropriate
pollution control program for the company. For this reason, the court
may request that the plaintiff and pollution control agencies submit
adequate control plans for implementation by the corporation pursuant
to the court order. The court may then order the shareholder to report
periodically to the court if he discovers that the corporation is not
satisfactorily complying with the approved plan. William J. Scott, the
present Attorney General of Illinois, in recognizing the present limitations
of court personnel and the problems involved in proper enforcement of
court orders, has suggested that a special court be established to handle
pollution cases."4 It would appear that Scott's proposal would provide the
best solution to the problem."5
As another possible remedy, a shareholder may petition the court
to order the directors and officers to reimburse the corporation for the
fines paid and for the damages which have resulted from the dissipation
and waste of assets."' Relief in this form, however, has several inherent
drawbacks. First, the remedy would be of limited effectiveness if the
charter of the corporation or the laws of the state in which it is in-
73. Id.
74. Chicago Today, Nov. 24, 1969, at 8, col. 2. The proposition that a special
pollution court be established in Illinois was also considered at the Illinois Con-
stitutional Convention. See Chicago Sun-Times, July 2, 1970, at 13, col. 1.
75. It would seem evident that a court which specializes in pollution control
would be more capable of dealing with the complex problems inherent in pollution
controversies than a court of general jurisdiction.
76. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
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corporated provide for the indemnification of directors and officers."'
Secondly, since the main goal of the shareholder is to prohibit further
polluting and not to recover money lost, such an order, although having
a limited restraining effect on the directors, would not produce the
result desired. Thirdly, it is questionable whether a court would hold a
director personally liable for every violation of the law unless the statutes
had specifically provided for such liability."' It is highly unlikely that
directors and officers would continue in their positions if they faced
personal liability for every corporate violation of law. 9
A court could conceivably restrict dividend payments so that earnings
could be used for the implementation of pollution control plans. This
action could be justified on the grounds that shareholders have benefited
in the past from dividends and minimum expenditures for pollution
control and therefore the shareholders, rather than the consumers, should
bear the cost of this control.8 " One difficulty with restricting dividend
payments, however, is the reluctance of most courts to interfere with the
dividend policy of a corporation.8' Courts may be forced, however, to
reevaluate their policy of not interfering with dividend payments if a
non-interference policy would permit corporations to escape their duty
in the area of pollution control.
Companies have delayed pollution control because of the potential
77. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 261 n.51 (1964).
78. The Clayton Act provides:
That whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal provisions of the
antitrust laws, such violations shall be deemed to be also that of the individual
directors, officers, or agents of such corporation who shall have authorized,
ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or in part such violation,
and such violation shall be deemed a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
therefor of any such director, officer, or agent he shall be punished by a fine
of not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or
by both, in the discretion of the court.
Clayton Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 14, 38 Stat. 736 (1914).
79. Comment, Factors That Limit the Negligence Liability of a Corporate
Executive or Director, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 343.
80. It should be noted that over the past 20 years nine of the larger companies
in the iron and steel industry paid approximately 21 billion dollars in dividends.
See generally MOODY'S INDUsTRIAL MANUAL (1969) for the following companies:
Armco Steel Corp., Bethlehem Steel Corp., Inland Steel Corp., Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corp., Kaiser Steel Corp., National Steel Corp., Republic Steel Corp., U.S. Steel
Corp., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. It may well be contended that the time has
arrived for the nation's corporations and their shareholders to begin maling reparations
for damage to society's environment.
81. Lattin has stated:
The general rule recognized by all courts is that it is within the sole discretion
of the directors to declare or not to declare a dividend when a legal fund is
available and, barring an abuse of discretion, the court will not interfere.
N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 459 (1959).
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obsolescence and inefficiency of control devices presently available. A
court, however, might demand that immediate use be made of devices
presently on the market despite their cost or degree of efficiency. A
public utility power plant, therefore, could be required to burn natural
gas rather than low cost, high-sulfur-content coal. Although this
requirement would place a financial burden on the company, many
courts have ignored the cost of pollution control where present technology
can be implemented to reduce the amount of contamination and the
damages resulting from it.8" Apparently, some courts are satisfied with
the old maxim that something is better than nothing.
An additional remedy available to the courts is the "cease and desist"
order. However, where immediate compliance is impossible, 8 it would
have limited usefulness because the issuance of such an order would
obviously result in a facility's closing. In the case of a public utility, the
use of a cease and desist order under such circumstances would be un-
tenable because a segment of the public would be forced to forego heat and
electricity. Although a court may be justified in closing a steel mill, the
probable adverse effect on employment would have to be seriously con-
sidered before the issuance of such an order. As the pollution problem
becomes more critical, it is possible that use of this extreme remedy may
be justified.
The problems presented by cease and desist orders are less serious
when a facility is still in the construction stage. If a company has begun
construction on a new facility and it is determined that the plans do not
include a pollution control system which will satisfy present standards,
the court may order that construction be halted until adequate plans
are presented. The Commonwealth Edison Company has encountered
this type of opposition to the construction of a nuclear power plant in
the Chicago area. 4 Although the plant would eliminate most problems of
air and water pollution, construction has been delayed because the
operation of the plant would require the discharge of large quantities
of warm water into Lake Michigan. Ecologists feared that this process
82. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963) (court
ordered pollution control devices to be installed within one year even though they were
very costly and partially ineffective) ; Herring Motor Co. v. Walka Co., 409
Pa. 126, 185 A.2d 565 (1962) (court ordered that defendant install appropriate equip-
ment to stop emissions of damaging vapors or be enjoined from further operation
despite high costs) ; Rode v. Sealtite Insulation Mfg. Corp., 3 Wis. 2d 286, 88 N.W.2d
345 (1958) (court ordered that nuisance be terminated in 90 days despite claim by
defendant that nuisance could not reasonably be abated within that time).
83. Compliance may be impossible where pollution equipment cannot be acquired
or installed before statutory deadlines.
84. Chicago Today, Oct. 16, 1969, at 4, col. I.
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would raise the water temperature to a point where the lake's ecological
balance would be upset.85 As evidenced by the pressure being exerted
on Edison, the public appears willing to reject technological advancement
until adequate environmental safeguards are provided.
A PROSPECTIVE LOOK AT POLLUTION AND
THE DERIVATIVE SUIT
A protestor's sign bearing the words "Water May Be Hazardous
To Your Health" or "Air Pollution Is A Dirty Word" may become a
familiar sight to Americans in the years ahead.
Pollution control must be made a national priority in the 1970's. A
mere awareness of the pollution problem will not clean up the air and
water for the 1980's. The problem necessitates immediate action from all
segments of society. As this note has suggested, the shareholder's
derivative suit could possibly provide the pressure necessary to "fill
the gaps" left open by the inadequate attack on pollution through
governmental and private efforts. The many problems involved in litigat-
ing the derivative suit in the complex area of pollution control should
not be allowed to obscure the important prospects of such a suit. The
derivative suit may be used to supplement the enforcement of pollution
laws as it has in the enforcement of antitrust laws. More importantly,
the derivative suit might play a significant role in forcing the business
community to accept a greater responsibility for solving a problem which
threatens the very existence of the society upon which it depends.
85. Id. See also Edwards, Legal Control of Thermal Pollution, 11 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 236 (1968) ; Jost, Cold Facts on Hot Water: Legal Aspects of Thermal
Pollution, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 253.
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APPENDIX
STATE POLLUTION STATUTES
Alabama Air Pollution Control Act
ALA. CODE tit. 8, § 288 (Supp. 1969)
Alabama Water Pollution Control Act
ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 140(6) (Supp. 1969)
Alaska Air Pollution Control Law
ALASKA STAT. § 18.30.005 (1962)
Alaska Water Pollution Control Act
ALASKA STAT. § 46.05.010 (1962)
Arizona Air Pollution Control Laws
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-770 (Supp. 1969)
Arizona Water Pollution Control Law
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1851 (Supp. 1969)
Arkansas Water & Air Pollution Control Act
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1901 (Supp. 1969)
California Air Pollution Control Laws
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39000
(Supp. 1969)
California Water Pollution Control Laws
CAL. WATER CODE § 13020 (Supp. 1969)
Colorado Air Pollution Control Act
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-1 (Supp. 1969)
Colorado Water Pollution Control Act
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-28-1 (Supp. 1967)
Connecticut Air Pollution Control Law
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-505 (1958)
Connecticut Clean Water Act
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54a (Supp. 1970)
Delaware Water & Air Resources Act
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001, 6101, 6201
(Supp. 1968)
Florida Air & Water Pollution Control Act
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.011 (Supp. 1970)
Georgia Air Quality Control Law
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-901 (Supp. 1969)
PERTINENT NUISANCE STATUTES
ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 1092-93 (1958)
No applicable statute
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-601-03
(1956)
No applicable statute
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3479 (1954)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-14
(1963)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-310-15
(1958)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1301-02
(1953)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.041, 386.051
(Supp. 1970)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 72-101, 72-201
(Revision 1964)
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APPENDIX
STATE POLLUTION STATUTES
Georgia Water Quality Control Act
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-501 (Supp. 1969)
Hawaii Air Pollution Control Law
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 322-60 (1968)
Hawaii Water Pollution Control Law
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 321-16 (1968)
Idaho Air Pollution Control Act
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-2901 (Supp. 1969)
Idaho State Board of Health Act
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-112 (Supp. 1969)
Illinois Environmental Protection Act
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111Y , § 1001
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971)
Indiana Air Pollution Control Law
IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4601 (Repl. 1969)
Indiana Stream Pollution Control Law
IND. ANN. STAT. § 68-517 (Repl. 1961)
Iowa Air Pollution Control Act
IOWA CODE ANN. § 136B (Supp. 1970)
Iowa Water Pollution Control Law
IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.1 (Supp. 1970)
Kansas Air Quality Control Act
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3001 (Supp. 1969)
Kansas Water Pollution Control Law
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-161-71 (1964)
Kentucky Air Pollution Control Law
Ky. REv. STAT. § 224.310 (Supp. 1968)
Kentucky Water Pollution Control Law
Ky. REv. STAT. § 224.101 (Supp. 1968)
Louisiana Air Control Law
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2201 (1965)
Louisiana Stream Control Commission Acts
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:1431 (1952)
Maine Air Pollution Control Law
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 561
(Supp. 1970)
Maine Water Pollution Control Law
MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361 (1964)
PERTINENT NUISANCE STATUTES
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 322-1 (1968)
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 52-111 (1947)
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 100 , §§ 26-29
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970)
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2502
(Repl. 1956)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 657.1 (1966)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-159 (1964)
KY. REv. STAT. § 211.210 (1963)
No applicable statute
ME. R -. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2701
(1964)
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STATE POLLUTION STATUTES
Maryland Air Quality Control Act
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 690 (Supp. 1969)
Maryland Water Pollution Control Laws
MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, §§ 23-29, 75-79
(Supp. 1969)
Massachusetts Air Pollution Control Laws
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 31C, 142A-D
(1967)
Massachusetts Clean Water Act
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 26 (Supp. 1969)
Michigan Air Pollution Act
MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 336.11 (1967)
Michigan Water Pollution Control Law
MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 323.1-.203 (1967)
Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 691.1201 (Supp. 1971)
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Law
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116.01 (Supp. 1970)
Minnesota Water Pollution Control Act
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115.01 (1964)
Mississippi Air & Water Control Act
Miss. CODE ANN. § 7106-111 (Supp. 1968)
Missouri Air Conservation Law
Mo. REV. STAT. § 203.010 (Supp. 1969)
Missouri Water Pollution Law
Mo. REv. STAT. § 204.010 (1959)
Montana Clean Air Act
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 69-3904
(2d Repl. 1970)
Montana Water Pollution Law
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 69-4801
(2d Repl. 1970)
Nebraska Air Quality Act
Neb. Sess. Laws ch. 554, § 1, [1969]
Nebraska Water Pollution Control Act
NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-3001 (Reissue 1966)
Nevada Air Pollution Control Law
NEV. REv. STAT. § 445.400 (1967)
Nevada Water Pollution Control Law
NEv. REv. STAT. § 445.010 (1969)
PERTINENT NUISANCE STATUTES
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 104A
(Repl. 1965)
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 122
(1967)
No applicable statute
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (1947)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 7037 (1942)
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 564.010-60 (1959)
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 57-101-15
(2d Repl. 1970)
NB. REv. STAT. § 28-1016
(Reissue 1964)
Nav. REv. STAT. § 202.180 (1967)
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STATE POLLUTION STATUTES
New Hampshire Air Pollution Control Law
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125:78 (Supp. 1969)
New Hampshire Water Pollution Control Law
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149:1 (Supp. 1969)
New Jersey Air Pollution Control Act
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-1 (1964)
New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection Act of 1970
N.J. Sess. Laws ch. 33, § 1, [1970]
New Jersey Water Pollution Control Laws
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-1 (1966)
New Mexico Air Quality Control Act
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-14-1 (Repl. 1968)
New Mexico Water Quality Act
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-39-1 (Repl. 1968)
New York Air Pollution Control Act
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH § 1264
(McKinney Supp. 1970)
New York Environmental Conservation Law
N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 140, § 1, [1970]
New York Water Pollution Control Law
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1200
(McKinney Supp. 1970)
North Carolina Water & Air Resources Act
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-211 (Supp. 1969)
North Dakota Air Pollution Control Act
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-2501 (Supp. 1969)
North Dakota Water Pollution Control Act
N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-01 (Supp. 1969)
Ohio Air Pollution Control Law
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.01
(Baldwin Supp. 1968)
Ohio Water Pollution Control Act of 1955
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.01
(Baldwin Supp. 1968)
Oklahoma Clean Air Act
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2001 (Supp. 1970)
Oklahoma Water Pollution Control Act of 1955
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 901 (1970)
PERTINENT NUISANCE STATUTES
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:13
(Supp. 1969)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3B-4, 26:3B-7
(1964)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-8-1-7
(Repl. 1964)
No applicable statute
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-20, 260-234
(Repl. 1964)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-01-01, 42-02-
01 (Repl. 1968)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.13.14
(Baldwin 1964); § 3767.32 (Bald-
win Supp. 1968)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 50, § 1 (1962)
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Oregon Air Pollution Control Laws
ORE. REv. STAT. § 449.702 (Repl. 1969)
Oregon Water Pollution Control Law
ORE. REV. STAT. § 449.075 (Repl. 1969)
Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4001 (1963)
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 (1963)
Rhode Island Clean Air Act
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 23-25-1
(1968)
Rhode Island Water Pollution Control Law
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-12-1 (1956)
South Carolina Pollution Control Act
S.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 555, § 1, [1970]
South Dakota Clean Air Act
S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 203, § 1, [1970]
South Dakota Water Pollution Law
S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 46-25-1 (1967)
Tennessee Air Pollution Control Act
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3408 (Supp. 1969)
Tennessee Stream Pollution Control Law
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-301 (1956)
Texas Clean Air Act
TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5
(Supp. 1969)
Texas Water Quality Act
TEX. Rxv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7621d-1
(Supp. 1969)
Utah Air Conservation Act
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-1 (Repl. 1967)
Utah Water Pollution Control Act
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-14-1 (Repl. 1967)
Vermont Air Pollution Control Law
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 351 (Supp. 1968)
Vermont Water Pollution Control Laws
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 571, 901;
tit. 18, § 1201 (1958)
PERTINENT NUISANCE STATUTES
No applicable statute
No applicable statute
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-30-13
(1956)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-78 (1962).
S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 21-10-1
(1967)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2903-07
(1956)
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-
1, §§ 2-3 (1966)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-43-1 (1953)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 609-10
(1958)
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APPENDIX
STATE POLLUTION STATUTES
Virginia Air Pollution Control Law
VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.9:1 (Supp. 1970)
Virginia State Water Control Law
VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.2 (Supp. 1970)
Washington Clean Air Act
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.010 (Supp. 1969)
Washington Water Pollution Control Laws
WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48 (Supp. 1969)
Washington Environmental Quality
Reorganization Act of 1970
Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 62, § 1, [1970]
West Virginia Air Pollution Control Law
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-20-1 (1966)
West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-SA-1 (Supp. 1970)
Wisconsin Air Pollution Control Law
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 144.30 (Supp. 1969)
Wisconsin Water Pollution Control Law
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 144.01 (Supp. 1969)
Wyoming Air Quality Act
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-487 (Supp. 1969)
Wyoming Protection of Public Water Supply Act
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-184 (1957)
PERTINENT NUISANCE STATUTES
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-865
(Repl. 1964)
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.66.010-.60
(1961)
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-3 (1966)
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.13-.14 (1961)
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-462 (1957)
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